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Abstract 
 
The primary purpose of the paper is to answer the following two questions regarding the 
performance of the influential Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal 
Reserve System, in comparison with the forecasts contained in the “Greenbooks” of the 
professional staff of the Board of Governors: Does the FOMC have expertise, and can it 
forecast better than the staff? The FOMC forecasts that are analyzed in practice are non-
replicable forecasts. In order to evaluate such forecasts, this paper develops a model to 
generate replicable FOMC forecasts, and compares the staff forecasts, non-replicable 
FOMC forecasts, and replicable FOMC forecasts, considers optimal forecasts and 
efficient estimation methods, and presents a direct test of FOMC expertise on non-
replicable FOMC forecasts. The empirical analysis of Romer and Romer (2008) is re-
examined to evaluate whether their criticisms of the FOMC’s forecasting performance 
should be accepted unreservedly, or might be open to alternative interpretations. 
 
 
Key words:  Direct test of FOMC expertise, FOMC forecast, forecast performance, 
replicable FOMC forecast, staff forecast. 
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“We also investigate the possible consequences of the FOMC’s misguided 
information.” (Romer and Romer (2008, p. 230)) 
 
“This may indicate that the FOMC’s attempts to add information to the staff 
forecast are not just unsuccessful, but may lead to inappropriate actions.” 
(ibid, p. 230) 
 
“The fact that for inflation and unemployment, the coefficient on the staff 
forecast is large and significant while that on the FOMC forecast is 
effectively zero implies not just that FOMC members fail to add information, 
but that their efforts to do so are counterproductive.” (ibid, p. 232) 
 
“The failure of the FOMC to bring useful additional information to the 
monetary policymaking process raises an obvious question: do policymakers 
act on their apparently useless information? To put it even more bluntly, are 
the FOMC’s efforts to improve on the staff forecasts just ineffective, or are 
they a potential source of monetary policy mistakes?” (ibid, p. 233) 
 
“It appears that monetary policymakers may indeed act on information that 
is of little or negative value.” (ibid, p. 234) 
 
“Policymakers appear to base at least some decisions on their apparently 
useless information.” (ibid, p. 235) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“Misguided, unsuccessful, inappropriate, effectively zero, fail to add, 
counterproductive, failure, apparently useless, ineffective, mistakes, 
negative value.”  
 
Such powerful criticisms of the influential Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of 
the Federal Reserve System by Romer and Romer (2008) present a timely, challenging 
and controversial empirical assessment of the FOMC’s purportedly deeply flawed 
forecasts of inflation, unemployment and real growth, in comparison with the forecasts 
contained in the “Greenbooks” of the professional staff of the Board of Governors.  
 
Taken at face value, the message is clear and disturbing: The FOMC’s forecasting 
performance has been decidedly unimpressive, at best. This paper examines whether the 
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FOMC has what might be called latent expertise, and thereby re-examines the forecasting 
performance of the Board of Governors staff and the FOMC to determine if the critical 
assessment in Romer and Romer (2008) should be accepted unreservedly, or might be 
open to alternative interpretations.  
 
A forecast is an inference about an event that was not observed at the time of the 
inference. Forecasts generated from econometric models are replicable. Depending on the 
loss function, replicable forecasts may be optimal as consistent estimates of the 
conditional expectation of a variable of interest, given the information set (see Patton and 
Timmermann (2007a, 2007b)). 
 
FOMC forecasts can have significant value in forecasting key monetary and 
macroeconomic variables. Although FOMC expertise is unobserved, it can nevertheless 
be estimated using an appropriate econometric model. Replicable FOMC forecasts can 
also be obtained from an appropriate econometric model. When FOMC forecasts are 
expressed as quantitative measures, they contain a qualitative (or latent) component, and 
hence also measurement error.  
    
The primary purpose of this paper is to answer two questions regarding the FOMC and 
staff forecasts: 
 
(i) Does the FOMC have expertise? 
(ii) Can the FOMC forecast better than the staff? 
 
In order to answer these questions, we develop a model to generate replicable FOMC 
forecasts, and compare the replicable and non-replicable FOMC forecasts using efficient 
estimation methods. A direct test of FOMC expertise on the FOMC forecast is also given.  
 
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents and compares the 
staff forecast, non-replicable FOMC forecast, and replicable FOMC forecasts, considers 
optimal forecasts and efficient estimation methods, and presents a direct test of FOMC 
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expertise on non-replicable FOMC forecasts. The empirical analysis of Romer and 
Romer (2008) is critically re-examined in Section 3. Concluding comments are given in 
Section 4.  
 
2. Model Specifications 
 
“We compare these staff and policymaker forecasts for the period 1979-
2001 with actual data to see if the FOMC forecasts contain useful 
information. We find that, for the most part, they do not.” (Romer and 
Romer (2008, p. 230)) 
 
“The FOMC should be able not just to match the staff, however, but to do 
better.” (ibid, p. 232) 
 
“Since the staff forecast reflects a great deal of effort by hundreds of highly 
trained professionals, it is not especially surprising that policymakers do not 
have useful additional information.” (ibid, p. 234) 
 
“But since policymakers know the staff forecast when they make theirs, the 
finding that the staff forecast contains information beyond what is in 
policymakers’ forecast indicates that the FOMC is not using its available 
information optimally in constructing its forecast.” (ibid, pp. 234-235) 
 
 
The staff model and forecast, non-replicable FOMC forecast, and replicable FOMC 
forecasts, are discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.1 Staff Model 
 
The variable of interest, tX , in Romer and Romer (2008) is given as  
 
tttt ecPbSaX +++= ,        (1) 
 
where tS  is the Staff forecast of tX , tP  is the Policymaker (or FOMC) forecast of tX , 
and a, b and c are constant parameters, where the notation is the same as in their paper. 
Although Romer and Romer (2008, p. 231) state that “Our main interest is in whether c is 
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positive”, it is clear that a finding of 0≠c  will reject the null hypothesis, ,0=c  that the 
staff forecast alone is needed to predict tX  (for an interpretation of equation (1) as two 
competing simple non-nested hypotheses, and hence also of the coefficients b and c, in 
the context of a comprehensive approach to testing non-nested models, see McAleer 
(1995)). In the empirical analysis of Romer and Romer (2008), the variable tX  is taken 
to be the inflation rate, unemployment rate, and real growth rate. 
 
Let )|( 1−−= tttt IXEXM , where 1−tI  is the information set available at time t-1 to 
Romer and Romer (2004), who have constructed various series of monetary shocks. 
Subtracting the conditional mean from (1) leads to the following equation: 
 
tttt eSPbaM +−+= )( .       (2) 
  
Equations (1) and (2) are used to test if the FOMC has anything to add to the staff 
forecast in explaining tX , and if the difference between tP  and tS  can explain tM , 
respectively. However, as explained in the Appendix, equation (2) can be derived from (1) 
only under highly implausible assumptions, and hence is unlikely to be consistent with 
the existence of (1). For this reason, we will not discuss (2) any further.  
 
If the econometric model underlying the staff forecast is correctly specified, Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) will be consistent and efficient, and hence optimal in estimation. In 
addition, under the assumption of mean squared error (MSE) loss, the optimal forecast of 
tX , given the information set available to the staff, is its conditional expectation (see 
Patton and Timmermann (2007a, 2007b)). 
 
However, if the staff forecast of tX  is not replicable because it is not based on an 
econometric model, it is neither optimal in estimation nor is the conditional expectation 
of tX  optimal with respect to a MSE loss function. 
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2.2 FOMC Forecasts and Replicable FOMC Forecasts 
 
The staff forecasts of tX , that is, tS , are made available to the FOMC, which is expected 
to improve on the forecast through adding information to tS . The FOMC expertise is 
latent, but it can be estimated. Therefore, an important issue to be addressed is whether 
the FOMC forecast can be replicated.  
 
Let P  represent the FOMC forecast, where the relationship between the FOMC forecast 
and latent FOMC expertise is given as 
 
),0(~, 2* IPP ησηη+= ,       (3) 
 
where P , *P  and η  are (T x 1) vectors, *P  represents the latent FOMC expertise, η  is 
the measurement error, and *P  and η  are assumed to be uncorrelated.  
 
Let the FOMC forecast be given as 
 
),0(~, 2 IWP ησηηδ += ,      (4) 
 
where the (T x k) matrix W is in the information set available to the FOMC at time t-1, 
and the first column of W is the unit vector. It is assumed that E( η'W ) = 0, δ  is a (k x 1) 
vector of constant parameters,  
 
 EIWSW 11},{ −⊂= , 
   
which is the information set of the FOMC at time t-1, W1 is (T x (k-1)), and S  is 
available to the FOMC before it announces P . 
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If the model in (4) is correctly specified, under the assumption of a MSE loss function, 
the optimal replicable FOMC forecast of P , given the information set EI 1− , is its 
conditional expectation, so the FOMC forecast is optimal. OLS estimation of the 
parameters in (4) is consistent and efficient, and hence is also optimal in estimation. 
However, if the FOMC does not have an appropriate econometric model in forming P , 
the resulting non-replicable FOMC forecast will not be optimal under a MSE loss 
function. 
 
It follows from (4) and EI 1−  that  
 
δWPIP E =≡Ε − *1 )|( ,        (5) 
 
so that W  denotes expertise as *P  is a linear combination of the columns of W . The 
rational expectations estimate of )|( 1
EIP −Ε , which is a replicable FOMC forecast, is 
given as  
 
PWWWWWPP ')'(* 1−
∧∧∧ === δ ,        (6) 
 
so that the estimate of FOMC expertise, *P , is equivalent to the estimate of the FOMC 
forecast, P .  
 
The FOMC model for forecasting X  is given by 
 
),0(~, 2*0 IuuPSaiX uσβδ +++= ,     (7) 
  
where a, 0δ  and β  are scalar parameters, and i  is a vector of unit elements. As *P  is 
latent, an observable, and hence estimable, version of (7) is given as 
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 εβδ +++= ∧PSaiX 0 ,       (8) 
 
where 
 
 
ηβ
ηδδβ
δβ
βε
W
W
W
Pu
WPWu
PPWu
PPu
−=
+−+=
−+=
−+= ∧
))((
)(
)( *
      (9) 
   
and WWWWPW
1)'( −= . As the measurement error, η , enters (9), the covariance matrix 
of ε  is not proportional to the identity matrix, and ε  is serially correlated and 
heteroskedastic. However, OLS estimation of the parameters in (8) will be consistent (see 
Franses et al. (2008) for a general discussion). 
 
The novelty of our approach is that, in contrast to (1), the model in (8) relates X  to S  
and the replicable FOMC forecast,
∧
P , rather than X  to S  and the non-replicable FOMC 
forecast, P . As S  is replicable, at least in principle, whereas P  is not, (8) provides a 
fairer comparison of replicable forecasts by the staff and FOMC, as compared with (1), 
which compares a replicable staff forecast with a non-replicable FOMC forecast. In this 
sense, comparing S  and 
∧
P  will provide a more powerful test of FOMC forecasting 
performance than comparing S  and P . Moreover, (8) provides a test of whether the 
FOMC uses the staff forecast, S , as a complement to the replicable FOMC forecast, 
∧
P .  
 
2.3 Efficient Estimation  
 
Franses et al. (2008) establish the conditions under which OLS estimation of the 
parameters in a more general version of (8) is efficient by appealing to Kruskal’s 
Theorem, which is necessary and sufficient for OLS to be efficient (see Fiebig et al. 
(1992) and McAleer (1992) for further details). In the context of OLS estimation of (8), 
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the necessary and sufficient conditions for OLS to be efficient will be satisfied if either 
the variables used to obtain the staff forecast are contained in the information set of the 
FOMC, or are orthogonal to the variables in the information set of the FOMC.  
 
Of the two alternative necessary and sufficient conditions, it is more likely that the 
former condition will hold. It was also shown by Franses et al. (2008) that, if the 
incorrect downward biased OLS standard errors are used, then the incorrect OLS t-ratios 
will be biased upward. They suggest that the correct OLS covariance matrix in (8) should 
be estimated consistently using the Newey-West HAC standard errors. 
 
2.4 A Direct Test of FOMC Expertise on FOMC Forecast 
 
Substituting for *P  from (3) into (7) gives 
 
)(0 βηβδ −+++= uPSaiX .      (10) 
 
Equation (10) is equivalent to (1), with βη−= ue . It is clear that OLS will be 
inconsistent in (10) as P  is correlated with η . Therefore, IV or GMM estimation should 
be used whenever the non-replicable FOMC forecast is used to forecast X . Romer and 
Romer (2008) used OLS to estimate the parameters in (15). Moreover, under a MSE loss 
function, the conditional expectation of X  in (10) is not optimal as a forecast, given the 
information set ),( PS . 
 
The effect of FOMC expertise on the non-replicable FOMC forecast can be tested 
directly by testing appropriate hypotheses in (4), which may be rewritten as  
 
 ),0(~, 2110 IWSWP ησηηδδηδ ++=+= .    (11) 
 
OLS is efficient for δ0 and δ1 in (11). 
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A direct test of FOMC expertise, namely whether the FOMC adds any additional 
information to S  in formulating the FOMC forecast, P , is given by 
 
 0: 10 =δH .         (12) 
  
If the null hypothesis in (12) is not rejected using a Wald or F test, FOMC expertise does 
not add significantly to the staff forecast in determining the FOMC forecast. 
 
As a special case of (11), the auxiliary regression equation to correlate the FOMC and 
staff forecasts is given by 
 
vSaiP ++= 0δ .    .    (13) 
 
In comparison with (11), it is clear that OLS applied to (13) omits 1W  (apart from an 
intercept term), which denotes FOMC expertise. As it is likely that 1W  and S  are 
correlated, OLS will be inconsistent and inferences will be invalid. It is also likely that v  
in (13) will be serially correlated, especially if the omitted 1W  contains lagged values of 
variables. Therefore, inferences based on (13) will be biased and invalid. Moreover, 
under a MSE loss function, the forecasts from (13) will not be optimal. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
We now turn to a detailed analysis of the Romer and Romer (2008) empirical results, and 
add some insights. 
 
The data are described in Romer and Romer (2008, pp. 230-231), and are available in an 
appendix on the AEA website (http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issues_datasets.php). For 
the reasons given in the Appendix, equation (1) in Romer and Romer (2008) will be 
estimated for the inflation rate, unemployment rate and rate of real growth, but not 
equation (2). 
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As discussed in Romer and Romer (2008, pp. 230-231), the FOMC prepares forecasts in 
February and July each year. The February forecasts for inflation and the growth rate are 
for the four quarters ending in the fourth quarter of the current year, and the 
unemployment rate forecast is for the fourth quarter of the current year. The July 
forecasts are for the same variables for both the current and next year. The sample is from 
1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July forecasts, giving a total of 68 
observations. 
 
[Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here] 
 
The actual inflation rate, unemployment rate and real growth rate, as well as the 
corresponding staff and FOMC forecasts, are shown in Figures 1-3, respectively. It is 
clear that the staff and FOMC forecasts are very similar, but it is also clear that they are 
not particularly close to the actual rates they are forecasting. The similarity in the two sets 
of forecasts is supported by the correlations in Table 1 between the staff and FOMC 
forecasts, which are obviously very similar. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The similarity in forecast performance is also shown in Table 2, which reports the mean 
and median squared prediction errors for the staff and FOMC forecasts for the three 
variables. The staff is clearly better than the FOMC in forecasting the inflation rate, the 
reverse holds in forecasting the real growth rate, and it is too close to call for the 
unemployment rate, with the staff only slightly better (worse) than the FOMC in terms of 
the mean (median) squared prediction error. In terms of forecasting performance, 
therefore, it would be fair to call the outcome a tie. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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In terms of formal tests of the forecasting performance of the staff and the FOMC, the 
OLS and GMM estimates of equation (1) (equivalently, equation (10), which shows that 
P  is correlated with the error term), are given in Table 3. As discussed previously, OLS 
is inconsistent and the forecast is not MSE optimal, while GMM is consistent. The 
instrument list for GMM uses the one-period lagged values of inflation, unemployment 
rate and real growth rate (except for the case of real growth, where only the second lag is 
used). The inconsistent OLS estimates correspond to those in Table 1 in Romer and 
Romer (2008), where it was inferred that the staff forecasts dominated those of the 
FOMC for inflation and the unemployment rate, though not for the real growth rate. It is 
instructive that the GMM estimates indicate that the staff is better than the FOMC in 
forecasting inflation, but not in forecasting the unemployment rate or the growth rate, 
where the effects of both the staff and FOMC forecasts are insignificant.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Although the OLS and GMM estimates of the coefficients are markedly different, it is 
worth noting that the sums of the estimated staff and FOMC marginal effects are very 
similar, namely 1.00 and 1.13 for inflation, 0.94 and 1.01 for the unemployment rate, and 
0.88 and 1.19 for the growth rate. In this sense, the sum of the parts would seem to be 
greater than the whole. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The OLS estimates of equations (4) (equivalently, equation (11), which makes the role of 
the staff forecast explicit) and (13), which deletes the effect of the FOMC expertise, are 
given in Table 4. For purposes of estimating (4) and (11), OLS is efficient and the 
forecast is MSE optimal, but OLS is inconsistent and the forecast is not MSE optimal for 
estimating (13).  
 
In the absence of FOMC expertise, the inconsistent OLS estimates for (13) might seem to 
suggest that the effect of the staff forecast on the FOMC forecast is very close to unity for 
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all three variables. However, the inclusion of FOMC expertise, as approximated by one-
period lagged inflation, unemployment and real growth rates, shows that the effect of the 
staff forecast, while remaining significant, is considerably less. The F test of the 
significance of FOMC expertise makes it clear that expertise does matter, and 
significantly so, in obtaining the non-replicable FOMC forecast, P . In short, the FOMC 
has statistically significant expertise. This answers our first question. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The empirical performance of the staff and replicable FOMC forecasts are compared in 
Table 5. Although OLS is efficient and the forecast is MSE optimal for equation (8), the 
standard errors are not proportional to the identity matrix, so the Newey-West HAC 
standard errors are also given. The staff is seen to dominate the FOMC for the inflation 
rate, but both the staff and FOMC forecasts are insignificant for the unemployment and 
real growth rates. Although the goodness of fit of the OLS estimates in Tables 3 and 5 are 
virtually identical, the corresponding coefficient estimates are markedly different. 
However, the sums of the estimated staff and FOMC marginal effects in Table 5 are very 
similar to their OLS counterparts in Table 3, at 1.01, 0.95 and 0.98 for inflation, 
unemployment rate and real growth rate, respectively. 
 
In summary, in a comparison with the staff forecasts, the use of FOMC forecasts and 
replicable FOMC forecasts yield considerably different empirical results. The answer to 
our second question, therefore, is that the FOMC does not forecast well, but neither does 
the staff! 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
“Our findings could also have implications for policymaking in other 
countries … monetary policymakers elsewhere might wish to consider the 
possibility that they do not have additional information, and to encourage 
empirical testing of this proposition.” (Romer and Romer (2008, p. 235))  
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We agree wholeheartedly with the sensible empirical recommendation of testing the 
proposition that policymaking bodies should have their forecasts tested against objective 
criteria. To this end, the primary purpose of the paper was to answer the following two 
questions regarding the influential Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the 
Federal Reserve System, in comparison with the forecasts contained in the “Greenbooks” 
of the professional staff of the Board of Governors:  
 
(i) Does the FOMC have expertise?  
(ii) Can the FOMC forecast better than the staff?  
 
The FOMC forecasts that are analyzed in practice are non-replicable forecasts. This paper 
developed a model to generate replicable FOMC forecasts, and compared the replicable 
and non-replicable FOMC forecasts using efficient estimation methods. A direct test of 
FOMC expertise on the FOMC forecast was also given. The paper compared staff 
forecasts, non-replicable FOMC forecasts, and replicable FOMC forecasts, considers 
optimal forecasts and efficient estimation methods, and presented a direct test of FOMC 
expertise on non-replicable FOMC forecasts. The empirical analysis of Romer and 
Romer (2008) was re-examined to evaluate whether the criticisms of the FOMC’s 
forecasting performance should be accepted unreservedly, or might be open to alternative 
interpretations. 
 
It is not easy to forecast economic fundamentals such as the inflation rate, unemployment 
rate and the rate of real growth. With this caveat in mind, the answers to the two 
questions posed in this paper are: 
 
(i) Yes, the FOMC has significant expertise; 
(ii) The forecasts of the FOMC and staff are very similar, and are equally good or 
equally bad.  
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Appendix: The Implausibility of Equation (2) in Romer and Romer (2008) 
 
 
The variable of interest, tX , is given as  
 
tttt ecPbSaX +++= ,       (1) 
 
In which Romer and Romer (2008, p. 231) suggest that c > 0. However, 0≠c  is 
sufficient to reject the null hypothesis, 0=c , that the staff forecast alone is needed to 
predict tX  (for an interpretation of equation (1), and hence also of the coefficients b and 
c, in the context of a comprehensive approach to testing non-nested models, see, for 
example, McAleer (1995)).  
 
Let )|( 1−−= tttt IXEXM , where 1−tI  is the information set available at time t-1 to 
Romer and Romer (2004). Subtracting the conditional mean from (1) gives  
 
ttttttttttt eIPEPcISESbIXEXM +−+−=−= −−− ))|(())|(()|( 111 , (1a) 
 
where it is assumed that 0)|( 1 =−tt IeE . 
 
In order to derive equation (2) in Romer and Romer (2008), it is necessary to make 
certain restrictive assumptions. If 0=+ cb , equation (1a) may be rewritten as  
 
tttttttt eIPEISEcSPcM +−+−= −− ))|()|(()( 11 .    (1b) 
 
If caIPEISE tttt /)|()|( 11 =− −− , then equation (1b) may be rewritten as 
 
tttt eSPbaM +−−= )( ,       (2) 
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which is equivalent to equation (2) in Romer and Romer (2008), as c can be positive or 
negative, so that b can be negative or positive. 
 
There is no reason to believe that caIPEISE tttt /)|()|( 11 =− −− , as tS  and  tP  can have 
time-varying conditional means that do not differ by a constant. It is also unlikely for 
0=+ cb  to hold, especially given the empirical evidence in Romer and Romer (2008) 
and in this paper (see Tables 3 and 5), which suggest that 1=+ cb  is more likely to hold. 
If 1=+ cb , equation (2) would be even less plausible, given equation (1).. 
 
Therefore, equation (2) in Romer and Romer (2008) is implausible as it is not consistent 
with equation (1). 
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Table 1 
 
Correlations between Staff Forecasts and FOMC Forecasts 
 
 
   Variable         Correlation 
 
 
   Inflation    0.99 
     
   Unemployment   0.99 
 
   Real growth    0.97 
 
 
Note: The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July forecasts, 
giving a total of 68 observations.  
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Table 2 
 
A Comparison of Staff Forecasts and FOMC Forecasts 
 
 
                                                                 Squared Prediction Errors 
 
     Mean    Median 
    __________________ __________________ 
 Variable  Staff  FOMC  Staff  FOMC  
 
 
 Inflation  0.71  0.89  0.19  0.28  
   
 Unemployment 0.54  0.57  0.16  0.15   
 
 Real growth  2.10  1.99  1.22  1.04   
 
 
 Note: The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July forecasts, 
giving a total of 68 observations.  
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Table 3 
 
A Comparison of Staff and FOMC Forecasts in Predicting Actual Values 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 
 
Estimation method Intercept       Staff (St)         FOMC (Pt)   R2 
 
 
Inflation 
 
OLS   -0.20   1.10**   -0.10   0.86 
   (0.22)   (0.39)  (0.37) 
 
GMM   -0.26   4.77**  -3.64   0.64  
   (0.34)   (2.32)  (2.26) 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
OLS    0.26    0.97*  -0.03   0.79 
   (0.41)   (0.38)  (0.40) 
 
GMM   -0.37   3.41  -2.40   0.64  
   (0.76)   (2.78)  (2.87) 
 
 
Real growth 
 
OLS    0.43    0.25    0.63   0.44 
   (0.36)   (0.49)  (0.52) 
 
GMM   -0.22    1.70  -0.51   0.31  
   (0.83)   (3.61)  (3.42) 
 
 
Notes: The regression model is  
 
 tttt ecPbSaX +++= , 
 
which is equation (1) in Romer and Romer (2008)), and equations (1) and (10) in this 
paper. The OLS estimates correspond to those in Table 1 of Romer and Romer (2008). 
The instrument list uses the one-period lagged values of inflation, unemployment rate and 
real growth (except for the case of real growth, where only lag 2 is used).  
*
 and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4 
 
Testing the Effect of Expertise on Expert Opinion 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 
 
   Inflation  Unemployment Real growth 
   ________  ____________ __________ 
 
Variables  (4) (13)  (4) (13)  (4) (13) 
 
 
Intercept  -0.18 0.01  -0.00 0.19  -0.22 0.28 
   (0.16) (0.07)  (0.13) (0.12)  (0.20) (0.08) 
 
Staff Forecast, St  0.91** 1.03**  0.77** 0.96**  0.86** 0.93** 
   (0.06) (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.03) 
  
Pt-1   0.38**   0.32**   0.33** 
   (0.12)   (0.12)   (0.12) 
 
St-1   -0.26*   -0.14   -0.19 
   (0.13)   (0.12)   (0.11) 
 
Inflationt-1  -0.03   -0.00   0.02 
   (0.04)   (0.02)   (0.03) 
 
Unemploymentt-1 0.04   0.04   0.03 
   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.03) 
   
Real growtht-1  0.01   0.01   0.02 
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03) 
 
  
R2   0.99 0.98  0.98 0.98  0.96 0.94 
 
F test    4.86**   5.79**   5.87**  
  
Notes: The regression equation correlates Pt and St through 
 
 ,0 ttt vSaP ++= δ  
 
which is equation (13), but omits FOMC expertise, 1W , as approximated by one-period 
lagged inflation, unemployment and real growth, in equations (4) and (11). 
*
 and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
 
A Comparison of Staff and Replicable FOMC Forecasts in Predicting Actual Values 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 
 
Estimation method Intercept        Staff (St)          FOMC (Pt)   R2 
 
 
Inflation 
 
OLS   -0.20   1.89**  -0.88   0.85 
   (0.23)   (0.72)  (0.70) 
 
HAC   [0.25]   [0.55]  [0.56] 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
OLS    0.22    0.80    0.15   0.79 
   (0.42)   (0.67)  (0.69) 
 
HAC   [0.67]   [0.71]  [0.71] 
 
 
Real growth 
 
OLS    0.10   -0.28    1.26   0.45 
   (0.45)   (0.84)  (0.91) 
 
HAC   [0.48]   [1.07]  [1.06] 
 
 
 
Notes: The regression model is  
 
 tttt PSaX εβδ +++= ˆ0 , 
 
which is equation (8). The Newey-West HAC standard errors are given in brackets.  
**
 denotes significance at the 1% level.  
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Figure 1 
 
Inflation rate, Staff forecasts (S_inflation) and FOMC forecasts (P_inflation) 
 
The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July 
forecasts (1979 is observation 1 and 2001 is observation 68). 
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Figure 2 
 
Unemployment rate, Staff forecasts (S_unemp) and FOMC forecasts (P_unemp) 
 
The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July forecasts 
(1979 is observation 1 and 2001 is observation 68). 
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Figure 3 
 
Growth rate, Staff forecasts (S_growth) and FOMC forecasts (P_growth) 
 
The sample is from 1979 to 2001, with 22 February forecasts and 46 July 
forecasts (1979 is observation 1 and 2001 is observation 68). 
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